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SPRING 1962]
LEMUEL SHAW: AMERICA'S "GREATEST MAGISTRATE'"
LEONARD W. LEVYtt
L EMUEL SHAW SERVED as Chief Justice of Massachusetts from
1830 to 1860, during an age which he said was remarkable for its
"prodigious activity and energy in every department of life."1 America
was being transformed by the rise of railroads, steam power, the
factory system, and the corporate form of business. A more complex
society, urban.and industrial, was superseding the older rural, agrarian
one. Only a pace behind the astonishing rate of economic change came
the democratization of politics and of society, while the federal system
lumbered toward its greatest crisis. During this time Shaw delivered
what is probably a record number of opinions for a single judge: over
two thousand and two hundred, enough to fill about twenty volumes
if separately collected.
At the time of his appointment to the bench, American law was
still in its formative period. Whole areas of law were largely un-
cultivated, many unknown, and few if any settled. Although Shaw was
not writing on a completely clean slate, the strategy of time and place
surely presented an unrivaled opportunity for a judge of strength and
vision to mold the law. His domain was the whole field of juris-
prudence excepting only admiralty. No other state judge through
his opinions alone had so great an influence on the course of American
law.
One of the major themes of his life work was the perpetuation of
what Oscar and Mary Handlin have called "the commonwealth idea
' 2
- essentially a quasi-mercantilist concept of the state within a demo-
cratic framework. In Europe where the state was not responsible to
the people and was the product of remote historical forces, mercantilism
served the ruling classes who controlled the state. In America men
put the social-contract theory into practice and actually made their
government. The people were the state; the state was their "Common
t This article is based on a paper delivered by the author at the 1961 Conference
of the Northeastern States Branch of the American Society for Legal History, held
at Boston College Law School on September 30, 1961.
t- Dean and Earl Warren Professor of American Constitutional History,
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University.
1. Shaw, Profession of the Law in the United States (Extract from an Address
delivered before the Suffolk Bar, May, 1827) AMxR. JuR. VII 56-65 (1832).
2. OSCAR & MARY HANDLIN, COMMONWALTH. A STUDY Ol THs RoLs or
GOVtRNM5NT IN THx AMXRICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSrTS, 1784-1861 31 (1947).
(389)
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Wealth." They identified themselves with it and felt that they should
share, as of right, in the advantages that it could bring to them as a
community. The state was their means of promoting the general
interest.
The Commonwealth idea precluded the laissez-faire state whose
function was simply to keep peace and order, and then, like a little
child, not be heard. The people of Massachusetts expected their Com-
monwealth to participate actively in their economic affairs. Where
risk-capital feared to tread or needed franchises, powers of incorpora-
tion, or the boost of special powers like eminent domain, the duty
of the state was to subsidize, grant, and supervise the whole process
in the interests of the general welfare. But regulation was not re-
stricted to those special interests which had been promoted by govern-
ment aid. Banks, insurance companies, liquor dealers, food vendors,
and others were all subjected to varying degrees of control, though
the public trough had not been open to them. The beneficent hand
of the state reached out to touch every part of the economy.
The Commonwealth idea profoundly influenced the development
of law in Massachusetts. It was largely responsible for the direction
taken by the law of eminent domain, for the development of the
police power, and for the general precedence given by the courts to
public rights over merely private ones. As employed by Shaw, the
Commonwealth idea gave rise to legal doctrines of the public interest
by which the power of the state to govern the economy was judicially
sustained.
The idea "that some privately owned corporations are more public
in character than others," as Edwin Merrick Dodd noted, "had already
begun to emerge in judicial decisions before 1830."' The grant of
powers of eminent domain to early turnpike and canal companies had
been upheld because these were public highways, although privately
owned. The mill acts, which originated as a means of promoting water-
powered gristmills, had also been sustained in early decisions on the
ground that a public purpose was served. While the earlier judges
regretted the extension of the old gristmill acts to new manufacturing
corporations, Shaw, by contrast, warmly accepted these acts because
he believed that industrialization would bring prosperity and progress
to the Commonwealth. Accordingly he declared that "a great mill-
power for manufacturing purposes" was, like a railroad, a species of
public works in which the public had a great interest. He even placed
"steam manufactories" in the same class as waterpowered mills, as
3. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 44 (1954).
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devoted to a public use, although steam-powered factories were never
granted powers of eminent domain.4
The Commonwealth idea underlay those remarkably prophetic
opinions of Shaw's that established the basis of the emerging law of
public utilities. The old common law of common calling had con-
sidered only millers, carriers, and innkeepers as "public employments";
it "knew no such persons as the common road-maker or the common
water-supplier."' 5 The "common road-maker," that is, the turnpike,
bridge, and canal companies, were added to the list of public employ-
ments or public works while Shaw was still at the bar. But it was
Shaw who settled the legal character of power companies, 6 turnpikes,7
railroads,' and water suppliers9 as public utilities, privately owned but
subject to regulation for the public benefit. He would have included
even manufacturers and banks. The Commonwealth idea left no doubt
as to whether the state would master or be mastered by its creatures.
the corporations, or whether the welfare of the economy was a matter
of public or private concern.
The police power may be regarded as the legal expression of the
Commonwealth idea, for it signifies the supremacy of public over
private rights. To call the police power a Massachusetts doctrine would
be an exaggeration, though not a great one. But it is certainly no
coincidence that in Massachusetts, with its Commonwealth tradition,
the police power was first defined and carried to great extremes from
the standpoint of vested interests. Shaw's foremost contribution in the
field of public law was to the development of the police-power concept.
The power of the legislature "to trench somewhat largely on the
profitable use of individual property," for the sake of the common good,
as Shaw expressed the police power in Commonwealth v. Alger,"0 was
consistently confirmed over thirty years of his opinions. Three decades
later, when judges were acting on the supposition that the Fourteenth
4. See Hazen v. Essex Co., 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 475 (1853); Palmer Co. v.
Ferrill, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 58 (1835).
5. DODD op. cit. supra note 3, at 161.
6. See Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 442 (1859); Hazen
v. Essex Co., 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 475 (1853); Murdock v. Stickney, 62 Mass.
(8 Cush.) 113 (1851) ; Chase v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 152 (1849);
Cary v. Daniels, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 466 (1844); French v. Braintree Mfg. Co.,
40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 216 (1839); Williams v. Nelson, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 141
(1839) ; Palmer Co. v. Ferrill, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 58 (1835) ; Fiske v. Framingham
Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68 (1831).
7. Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 175 (1834).
8. City of Roxbury v. Boston & Providence RR., 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 424
(1850); Newbury Tpk. Corp. v. Eastern R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 326 (1839);
Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 512
(1835) ; Wellington, Petitioners, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87 (1834).
9. Lumbard v. Stearns, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 60 (1849).
10. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
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Amendment incorporated Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, the ideas
expressed in Shaw's opinions seemed the very epitome of revolutionary
socialism. Shaw's name was revered, but the implications of his police-
power opinions were politely evaded. In the period between Shaw
and the school of Holmes and Brandeis, American law threatened to
become the graveyard of general-welfare or public-interest doctrines,
and doctrines of vested rights dominated.
The trend toward legal Spencerianism was so pronounced by the
end of the nineteenth century that legal historians concentrated on a
search for the origins of doctrines of vested rights, almost as if con-
trary doctrines had never existed. When touching the pre-Civil War
period, it is conventional to quote Tocqueville on the conservatism of
the American bench and bar, to present American law almost exclusively
in terms of Marshall, Story, and Kent, and to emphasize that the rights
of property claimed the very warmest affections of the American
judiciary. If, however, the work of the state courts were better known,
this view of our legal history might be altered. But Gibson and Ruffin
and Blackford are little more than distinguished names, their work
forgotten. Shaw's superb exposition of the police power is respectfully
remembered, but it is usually treated as exceptional, or mistreated as
an attempt to confine the police power to the common-law maxim
of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas."
Shaw taught that "all property.., is derived directly or indirectly
from the government, and held subject to those general regulations,
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.'1 2 Dean
Pound, in discussing the "extreme individualist view" of the common
law concerning the rights of riparian property owners, says the
common law asked simply, "was the defendant acting on his own
land and committing no nuisance?"'" But Shaw believed that the
common law of nuisances, which was founded on the sic utere maxim,
inadequately protected the public, because it was restricted to the
abatement of existing nuisances. He believed that the general welfare
required the anticipation and prevention of prospective wrongs from
the use of private property. Accordingly he held that the legislature
might interfere with the use of property before its owner became
amenable to the common law. So a man could not even remove stones
11. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT O11 TH4 SUPRwMg COURT 68 (1934); FRxUND, Tns
POLIcS POWUR 425, § 405 (1904). For an extended discussion of the police power
decisions by Shaw, see Lxvy, THE LAW O1 THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHiSP JusTIcE
SHAW ch. 13 (1957).
12. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 83-4 (1851).
13. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF TH4 COMMON LAW 53-4 (1921).
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from his own beach if prohibited by the legislature, nor erect a wharf
on his property beyond boundary lines fixed by it. Even if his use
of his property would be "harmless" or "indifferent," the necessity of
restraints was to be judged "by those to whom all legislative power is
intrusted by the sovereign authority." Similarly the "reasonableness"
of such restraints was a matter of "expediency" to be determined by the
legislature, not the court. The simple expedient of having a precise
statutory rule for the obedience of all was sufficient reason for a finding
of constitutionality.1"
Thus Shaw, using the Commonwealth idea, established a broad
base for the police power. He carried the law's conception of the public
good and the power of government to protect it a long way from the
straitjacketing ideas of Kent and Story. Their position may be summed
up in Blackstone's language that "the public good is in nothing more
essentially interested than the protection of every individual's private
rights."15
A few other decisions of the Shaw Court on the police power will
illustrate that the Chief Justice's Alger opinion was more than rhetoric.
The authority of the legislature to shape private banking practices in
the public interest was unequivocally sustained in two sweeping opin-
ions. In one, Shaw said that a statute intended to prevent banks from
"becoming dangerous to the public" was attacked as unconstitutional
on the authority of Marshall, Story, and Kent. The statute allegedly
operated retroactively against the bank in question; constituted a legis-
lative assumption of judicial power because it required the Supreme
Judicial Court to issue a preliminary injunction against banks on the
findings of a government commission; and violated the federal contract
clause by providing for a perpetual injunction against the further doing
of business, in effect a revocation of the charter. Rufus Choate probably
never argued a stronger case. But Shaw sustained the statute and the
injunction, peppering his opinion with references to the paramountcy
of "the great interests of the community," the duty of the government
to "provide security for its citizens," and the legitimacy of interferences
with "the liberty of action, and even with the right of property, of such
institutions.""l In a second bank case of the same year, 1839, the
Court refused "to raise banks above the control of the legislature."
The holding was that a charter could be dissolved at the authority of
14. Quotations are from Shaw's opinions in the Alger case and in Commonwealth
v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846).
15. Quoted by POUND, THZ SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 53 (1921).
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the legislature, under the reserved police power, without a judicial
proceeding.17
It has been said that from the standpoint of the doctrine of vested
rights the most reprehensible legislation ever enacted was the pro-
hibition on the sale of liquor. Such legislation wiped out the value
of existing stocks and subjected violators to criminal sanctions, their
property to public destruction. Similarly, buildings used for purposes
of prostitution or gambling might, on the authority of the legislature,
be torn down. The question presented by such statutes was whether
the police power could justify uncompensated destruction of private
property which had not been appropriated for a public use. The power
of the Commonwealth over the health and morals of the public provided
Shaw with the basis for sustaining legislation divesting vested rights.1"
On half a dozen occasions, the New York Wynehammer doctrine of
substantive due process of law was repudiated in such cases.1
Regulation of railroads was another subject for the exercise of
the police power, according to the Shaw Court. The same principles
that justified grants of eminent domain to railroads, or to canals,
bridges, turnpikes, power companies, and water suppliers, also pro-
vided the basis for sustaining controls over their rates, profits, and
services. Railroads, said Shaw, were a "public work, established by
public authority, intended for the public use and benefit . . . ."o The
power to charge rates was "in every respect a public grant, a franchise
• . . subject to certain regulations, within the power of government,
if it should become excessive."21
These dicta by Shaw became holdings at the first moment the
railroads challenged the "reasonableness" of the rates and services
fixed by government railroad commissions. "Reasonableness" was
held to be a matter for determination by the legislature or the com-
mission to which it delegated its powers. Those powers, in turn, were
broadly construed. The Court would not interfere with the regulatory
process if the railroads had the benefit of notice, hearing, and other
17. Crease v. Babcock, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 334 (1839).
18. Commonwealth v. Howe, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 26 (1859); Brown v. Perkins,
70 Mass. (12 Gray) 89 (1858) ; Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854);
Commonwealth v. Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 352 (1837). These are the
leading cases among dozens.
19. E.g., Commonwealth v. Howe, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 26 (1859); Common-
wealth v. Logan, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 136 (1859); Commonwealth v. Murphy,
76 Mass. (10 Gray) 1 (1857) ; Calder v. Kurby, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 597 (1856);
Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 482 (1855); Commonwealth v.
Clap, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 97 (1855). For the Wynehammer doctrine see, Wyne-
hammer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 168 (N.Y.
1855) ; Wynehammer v. People, 20 Barb. 567 '(N.Y. 1855).
20. Worcester v. Western R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 564, 566 (1842).
21. B. & L. R.R. v. S. & L. R.R., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 1, 29 (1854).
[VOL. 7: p. 389
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fair procedures." Due process of law to the Shaw Court meant
according to legal forms, not according to legislation which the Court
approved or disapproved as a matter of policy.
The Shaw Court's latitudinarian attitude toward the police power
was influenced by the strong tradition of judicial self-restraint among
Massachusetts judges, an outgrowth of the Commonwealth idea. Shaw
carried on the tradition of the Massachusetts judiciary. During the
thirty years that Shaw presided, there were only ten cases, one unre-
ported, in which the Supreme Judicial Court voided legislative enact-
ments.
Four of these cases in no way related to the police power. One
involved a special legislative resolution confirming a private sale that
had divested property rights of third persons without compensation. -3
The second concerned an act by which Charlestown was annexed to
Boston without providing the citizens of Charlestown with representa-
tive districts and an opportunity to vote. 4 The third, an unreported
case decided by Shaw sitting alone, involved the "personal liberty act,"
by which the state sought to evade Congress' Fugitive Slave Law. -5
Here Shaw felt bound by the national Constitution and by a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States. In the fourth case he invali-
dated a state act which dispensed with the ancient requirement of grand
jury proceedings in cases of high crimes. 6 In each of these four, the
decisions are above any but trifling criticism.
Of the six cases bearing on the police power, three involved legis-
lation egregiously violating procedural guarantees that are part of our
civil liberties.27  The statutes in question had validly prohibited the
sale of liquor. But they invalidly stripped accused persons of virtually
every safeguard of criminal justice, from the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures to the rights that cluster around
the concept of fair trial. Shaw's decisions against these statutes, like
his decisions insuring the maintenance of grand jury proceedings and
the right to vote, were manifestations of judicial review in its best
sense. There were also dicta by Shaw on the point that the legislature
cannot restrain the use of property by ex post facto laws, by bills of
attainder, or by discriminatory classifications. Thus the limitations
22. B. & W. RR. v. Western RR., 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 253 (1859) and L. & W.
RR. v. Fitchburg RR., 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 266 (1859).
23. Sohier v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 483 (1849).
24. Warren v. Mayor and Alderman of Charlestown, 57 Mass. (3 Gray) 84
(1854).
25. Commonwealth v. Coolidge, LAW Rnp. V 482 (Mass. 1843).
26. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
27. Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454 (1859) ; Sullivan v. Adams,
69 Mass. (3 Gray) 476 (1855) ; Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854).
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placed upon the police power by the Shaw Court were indispensable
to the protection of civil liberties.
The only exception to this generalization consists of the limitation
derived from the contract clause of the United States Constitution.
But there were only three cases during the long period of Shaw's Chief
Justiceship in which this clause was the basis for the invalidation of
statutes. In each of the three, the statutes were of limited operation
and the decisions made no sacrifice of the public interest. The legislature
in one case attempted to regulate in the absence of a reserved power to
alter or amend public contracts; the Court left a way open for the legis-
lature's purpose to be achieved under common law.2 In the other
two cases, regulatory powers had been reserved but were exercised
in particularly faithless and arbitrary ways; in one case to increase
substantially the obligations of a corporation for a second time, in
effect doubling a liability which had been paid off; in the other case to
repeal an explicit permission for a corporation to increase it capitaliza-
tion in return for certain services rendered. 2  The legislature in all
three cases had passed a high threshold of judicial tolerance for govern-
mental interference with the sanctity of contracts. The decisions were
hardly exceptional, considering the facts of the cases and their dates -
they were decided between 1854 and 1860, after scores of similar de-
cisions by Federalist, Whig, and Jacksonian jurists alike in state and
federal jurisdictions.
The striking fact is that there were so few such decisions by the
Shaw Court in thirty years. Handsome opportunities ,were provided
again and again by litigants claiming impairment of their charters of
incorporation by a meddlesome legislature. But the Court's decisions
were characterized by judicial self-restraint rather than an eagerness
to erect a bulwark around chartered rights. The three cases in which
statutes were voided for conflict with the contract clause were unusual
for the Shaw Court.
Generally the attitude of the Court was typified by Shaw's remark
that "immunities and privileges (vested by charter) do not exempt
corporations from the operations of those laws made for the general
regulation . . . ."" He habitually construed public grants in favor
of the community and against private interests. When chartered powers
28. Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854).
29. Central Bridge Corp. v. City of Lowell, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 106 (1860);
Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 239 (1859). For an extended
discussion of judicial review and of constitutional limitations under Shaw see,
LXvY, op. cit. supra note 11, at ch. 14.
30. Commonwealth v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 542
(1838).
[VOL. 7: p. 389
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were exercised in the public interest, he usually interpreted them
broadly; but when they competed with the right of the community to
protect itself or conserve its resources, he interpreted chartered powers
narrowly. He did not permit the public control over matters of health,
morals, or safety, nor the power of eminent domain, to be alienated
by the contract clause.
In the face of such a record it is misleading to picture state
courts assiduously searching for doctrines of vested rights to stymie
the police power. Certainly no such doctrines appeared in the pre-
Civil War decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
except for the one doctrine derived by John Marshall from the contract
clause and so sparingly used by Shaw. The sources from which vested-
rights doctrines were derived by others - the higher law, natural
rights, the social compact, and other sources of implied, inherent limi-
tations on majoritarian assemblies - these were invoked by Shaw
when he was checking impairments or personal liberties or traditional
procedures of criminal justice.
If this picture does not fit the stereotype of conservating Whig
jurists, the stereotype may need revision. On the great issue which
has historically divided liberals from conservatives in politics - govern-
ment controls over property and corporations - Shaw supported the
government. Even when the Commonwealth idea was being eroded
away by those who welcomed the give-away state but not the regula-
tory state, Shaw was still endorsing a concept of the police power
that kept private interests under government surveillance and restraint.
He would not permit the Commonwealth idea to become just a rationale
for legislative subventions and grants of chartered powers, with busi-
ness as the only beneficiary. To Shaw, government aid implied govern-
ment control, because the aid to business was merely incidental to the
promotion of the public welfare. No general regulatory statute was
invalidated while he was Chief Justice. His conservatism tended to
crop out in common law cases where the public interest had not been
defined or suggested by statute. In such cases the law was as putty
in his hands, shaped to meet the press of business needs. Nothing
illustrates this better than the personal injury cases and the variety
of novel cases to which railroad corporations were parties. The roar
of the first locomotive in Massachusetts signaled the advent of a
capitalist revolution in the common law, in the sense that Shaw made
railroads the beneficiaries of legal doctrine.3' To be sure, he believed
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that he was genuinely serving the general interest on the calculation
that what was good for business was good for the Commonwealth.
It was when he had a free hand, in the absence of government
action, that the character of his conservatism displayed itself: He con-
strued the law so that corporate industrial interests prevailed over
lesser, private ones. An individual farmer, shipper, passenger, worker,
or pedestrian, when pitted against a corporation which in Shaw's mind
personified industrial expansion and public prosperity, risked a rough
sort of justice, whether the issue involved tort or contract.82 Shaw
strictly insisted that individuals look to themselves, not to the law,
for protection of life and limb, for his beloved common law was in-
corrigibly individualistic. The hero of the common law was the prop-
erty-owning, liberty-loving, self-reliant reasonable man. He was also
the hero of American society, celebrated by Jefferson as the free-hold
farmer, by Hamilton as the town-merchant, by Jackson as the frontiers-
man. Between the American image of the common man and the
common-law's ideal Everyman, there was a remarkable likeness. It
harshly and uncompromisingly treated men as free-willed, self-reliant,
risk-and-responsibility taking individuals. Its spirit was, let every man
beware and care for himself. That spirit, together with Shaw's belief
that the rapid growth of manufacturing and transportation heralded the
coming of the good society, tended to minimize the legal liabilities of
business.
This was especially striking in cases of industrial accident and
personal injury cases generally. For example, when an accident oc-
curred despite all precautions, Shaw held railroads liable for damage
to freight but not for injuries to passengers. They, he reasoned, took
the risk of accidents that might occur regardless of due care. His
opinions went a long way to accentuate the inhumanity of the common
law in the area of torts, and simultaneously, to spur capitalist enter-
prise. Here was the one great area of law in which he failed to protect
32. Denny v. New York Central R.R., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 481 (1859); Shaw
v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 45 (1857) ; Lucas v. New Bedford
& Taunton R.R., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 64 (1856); Nutting v. Conn. River R.R., 67
Mass. (1 Gray) 502 (1854); Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 67 Mass.
(1 Gray) 263 (1854); Brown v. Eastern R.R., 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 97 (1853);
Lichtenheim v. Boston & Providence R.R., 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 70 (1853); Props.
of Locks and Canals v. Nashua & Lowell R.R., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 385 (1852);
Hollenbeck v. Berkshire R.R., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 478 (1852); Kearney v. Boston
& Worcester R.R., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 108 (1851); McElroy v. Nashua & Lowell
R.R., 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 400 (1849); Cary v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.)
475 (1848); Snow v. Eastern R.R., 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 44 (1846); Lewis v.
Western R.R., 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 509 (1846) ; Draper v. Worcester & Norwich
R.R., 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 505 (1846); Worcester v. Western R.R., 45 Mass. (4
Met.) 564 (1842); Thompson v. Boston & Providence R.R., Daily Evening Tran-
script (Boston) Jan. 6, 1837; Gerry v. Boston & Providence R.R., Daily Evening
Transcript (Boston) Dec. 29, 1836.
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the public interest. He might have done so without stymying rapid
industrialization, because the cost of accidents, if imposed on business,
would have been ultimately shifted to the public by a hike in prices and
rates.
The rigorous individualism of the common law was especially.
noticeable in the emergent doctrine of contributory negligence, of which
Shaw was a leading exponent. 33 That doctrine required a degree of
care and skill which no one but the mythical "prudent" or "reasonable
man" of the common law could match. A misstep, however slight, from
the ideal standard of conduct, placed upon the injured party the whole
burden of his loss, even though the railroad was also at fault and per-
haps more so. Comparative rather than contributory negligence would
have been a fairer test, or perhaps some rule bywhich damages could
be apportioned.
Probably the furthermost limit of the common law's individualism
in accident cases was expressed in the rule that a right to action is
personal and dies with the injured party. This contributed to the re-
lated rule that the wrongful death of a human being was no ground for
an action of damages.3 4 But for the intervention of the legislature, the
common law would have left the relatives of victims of fatal accident
without a legal remedy to obtain compensation. Shaw would also have
made it more profitable for a railroad to kill a man outright than to
scratch him, for if he lived he could sue. 5
The fellow-servant rule was the most far-reaching consequence of
individualism in the law as Shaw expounded it.3" The rule was that a
worker who was injured, through no fault of his own, by the negligence
of a fellow employee, could not maintain a claim of damages against
his employer. Shaw formulated this rule at a strategic moment for
employers, because as industrialization expanded at an incredible pace,
factory and railroad accidents multiplied frighteningly. Since the
fellow-servant rule threw the whole loss from accidents upon innocent
workers, capitalism was relieved of an enormous sum that would
otherwise have been due as damages. The encouragement of "infant
industries" had no greater social cost.
The fellow-servant rule was unmistakably an expression of legal
thinking predicated upon the conception that a free man is one who
33. Shaw v. B. & W. R.R., 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 45 (1857); Brown v. Kendell,
60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
34. Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 475 (1848).
35. Hollenbeck v. Berkshire R.R., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 478 (1852); Kearney v.
Boston & Worcester R.R., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 108 (1851).
36. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). See
Lzvy, op. cit. supra note 11, at ch. 10.
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is free to work out his own destiny, to pursue the calling of his choice,
and to care for himself. If he undertakes a dangerous occupation, he
voluntarily assumes the risks to which he has exposed himself. He
should know that the others with whom he will have to work may
cause him harm by their negligence. He must bear his loss because
his voluntary conduct has implied his consent to assume it and to re-
lieve his employer of it. On the other hand, there can be no implication
that the employer has contracted to indemnify the worker for the
negligence of anyone but himself. The employer, like his employees,
is responsible for his own conduct, but cannot be liable without fault.
On such considerations Shaw exempted the employer from liability
to his employees, although he was liable to the rest of the world for the
injurious acts which they committed in the course of their employment.
It is interesting to nbe that Shaw felt obliged to read the employee's
assumption of risk into his contract of employment. This legal fiction
also reflected the individualism of a time when it was felt that free
men could not be bound except by a contract of their own making.
The public policy which Shaw confidently expounded in support of
his reading of the law similarly expressed the independent man: safety
would be promoted if each worker guarded himself against his own
carelessness and just as prudently watched his neighbor; to remove
this responsibility by setting up the liability of the employer would
llegedly tend to create individual laxity rather than prudence. So
Shaw reasoned. It seems not to have occurred to him that fear of being
maimed prompted men to safety anyway, or that contributory negli-
gence barred recovery of damages, or that freeing the employer from
liability did not induce him to employ only the most careful persons
and to utilize accident-saving devices. Nor, for all his reliance upon
the voluntary choice of mature men, did it occure to Shaw that a
worker undertook a dangerous occupation and "consented" to its risks
because his poverty deprived him of real choice. For that matter, none
of these considerations prompted the legislature to supersede the com-
mon law with employers' liability and workmen's compensation acts
until many decades later. Shaw did no violence to the spirit of his age by
the fellow-servant rule, or by the rules he applied in other personal injury
cases, particularly those involving wrongful death. In all such cases
his enlightened views, so evidenced in police-power cases, were absent,
probably because government action was equally absent. On the other
hand his exposition of the rule of implied malice in cases of homicide87
37. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 463 (1855) ; Commonwealth
v. Webster, 59 Mass. (3 Cush.) 295 (1850); Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass.
(9 Met.) 93 (1845). See Lvy, op. cit. supra note 11, at 218-28.
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and of the criminal responsibility of the insane"8 accorded with the
growing humanitarianism of the day as well as with doctrines of
individualism.
Shaw's conservatism tended to manifest itself in cases involving
notable social issues of his time. For example he handed down the leading
opinion on the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850;"0
he originated the "separate but equal" doctrine which became the legal
linchpin of racial segregation in the public schools throughout the
nation ;4 and in the celebrated Abner Kneeland case,4 he sustained a
conviction for blasphemy that grossly abridged freedom of conscience
and expression; still another opinion was a bulwark of the establish-
ment of religion which was maintained in Massachusetts until 1833.42
But it would be misleading as well as minimally informing to con-
clude an analysis of Shaw's work by calling him a conservative, for the
word reveals little about Shaw if it is also applied to Marshall, Kent,
Story, Webster, and Choate.
When Story and Kent, steeped in the crusty lore of the Year
Books, were wailing to each other that they were the last of an old
race of judges and that Taney's Charles River Bridge decision 43 meant
that the Constitution was gone,"4 Shaw was calmly noting that prop-
erty was "fully subject to State regulation" in the interest of the
"morals, health, internal commerce, and general prosperity of the
community ...."* In 1860 at the age of eighty, in an opinion which
is a little gem in the literature of the common law, he gave fresh evi-
dence of his extraordinary talent for keeping hoary principles viable by
adapting them - as he put it - "to new institutions and conditions of
society, new modes of commerce, new usages and practices, as the
society in the advancement of civilization may require."48
Shaw's mind was open to many of the liberal currents of his time.
Witness his support from the bench of the free, public education move-
38. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met) 500 (1844): See Lzw,
op. cit. jupra note 11, at 207-18.
39. Sims' Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285 (1851). See Levy, Sims' Case: The
Fugitive Slave Law in Boston in 1851, J. NGRo HisToRY, 35, 39-74 (1950) and
Lvy, op. cit. jupra note 11, at ch. 6.
40. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849). See Levy &
Phillips, The Roberts Case: Source of the 'Separate But Equal' Doctrine, Am.
HxsT. Rv. 56, 510-18 (1951) and Lavy, op. cit. supra note 11, at ch. 7.
41. Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838). See Levy,
Satan's Last Apostle in Massachusetts, AMRICAN QUvAuRMJ.y V, 16-30 (1953)
and LEvy, op. cit. supra note 11, at ch. 5.
42. Stebbins v. Jennings, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 172 (1830). See LVY, op. cit.
supra note 11, at ch. 3.
43. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
44. HORToN, JAMs KENT 293-95 (1939): SWiSHER, ROGER B. TANEY 377-79
(1936).
45. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 359, 363 (1837).
46. Commonwealth v. Temple, 77 Mass. (14 Gray) 69, 74 (1859).
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ment,47 or his public-interest doctrines,4" or his defense of trade-union
activities,49 or his freeing sojourner slaves. While Shaw was Chief
Justice all slaves whom fate brought to Massachusetts were guaranteed
liberty, except for runaways. Whether they were brought by their
masters who were temporarily visiting the Commonwealth or were just
passing through, or whether they were cast up by the sea, they were set
free by Shaw's definition of the law. Bound by neither precedent nor
statute, he made that law. The principle of comity, he ruled, could
not extend to human beings as property: because slavery was so odious
and founded upon brute force it could exist only when sanctioned by
positive, local law. There being no such law in Massachusetts, Shaw
freed even slave seamen in the service of the United States Navy if
they reached a port within his jurisdiction.5"
In the area of criminal law dealing with conspiracies, Shaw seems
on first glance to have run counter to individualist doctrines. He held,
in what is probably his best-known opinion, 51 that a combination of
workers to establish and maintain a closed shop by the use of peaceable
coercion is not an indictable conspiracy even if it tends to injure em-
ployers. Shaw also indicated that he saw nothing unlawful in a peace-
able, concerted effort to raise wages.
But other judges had been persuaded by the ideology of indi-
vidualism, or at least used its rhetoric, to find criminality in trade-
union activity and even in unions per se. Combination, labor's most
effective means of economic improvement, was the very basis of the
ancient doctrine of criminal conspiracy and the denial of individual
effort.* The closed shop was regarded as a hateful form of monopoly by
labor, organized action to raise wages as coercion, and both regarded
as injurious to the workers themselves, as well as to trade and the
public at large. When so much store was placed in self-reliance, the
only proper way in law and economics for employees to better them-
selves seemed to be by atomistic bargaining. Unions were thought to
impede the natural operation of free competition by individuals on both
sides of the labor market. Or so Shaw's contemporaries and earlier
judges had believed.
47. SHAW, A CHARGE DELIVERED TO THE GRAND JURY POR THE COUNTY O
EssEx, MAY TERM 1832 15-16 (1832).
48. See notes 6 through 9, supra.
49. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
50. The leading case is Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1936).
See also Betty's Case, LAW REP. XX, 455 (1857); Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald,
LAW REP. VII, 379 (Mass. 1844); Commonwealth v. Porterfield, LAW REP. VII, 256
(Mass. 1844); Commonwealth v. Ludlum, The Liberator (Boston) Aug. 31, 1841;
Anne v. Eames (1836) in Report of the Holden Slave Case, Holden Anti-Slavery
Society pamphlet (1839) ; Commonwealth v. Howard, AM. JUR. IX, 490 (1832).
51. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842). See LEvY, op. cit.
supra note 11, at ch. 11.
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Individualism, however, has many facets, and like maxims relating
to liberty, the free market, or competition, can be conscripted into
the service of more than one cause. If self-reliance was one attribute of
individualism, the pursuit of self-interest was another. As Tocqueville
noted, where individualism and freedom prevail, men pursue their
self-interest and express themselves by developing an astonishing pro-
clivity for association. As soon as several Americans of like interest
"have found one another out, they combine," observed Tocqueville.
Shaw too noted the "general tendency of society in our times, to
combine men into bodies and associations having some object of deep
interest common to themselves . ". ..- He understood that freedom
meant combination.
When the question arose whether it was criminal for a combina-
tion of employees to refuse to work for one who employed non-union
labor, Shaw replied in the disarming language of individualism that
men who are not bound by contract are "free to work for whom they
please, or not to work, if they so prefer. In this state of things, we
cannot perceive, that it is criminal for men to agree together to exercise
their acknowledged rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their
own interests." 53
He acknowledged that the pursuit of their own interests might
result in injury to third parties, but that did not in his opinion make
their combination criminal in the absence of fraud, violence, or other
illegal behavior. To Shaw's mind the pursuit of self-interest was a
hard, competitive game in which atomistic individuals stood less
chance of getting hurt by joining forces. He also seems to have con-
sidered bargaining between capital and labor as a form of competition
whose benefits to society, like those from competition of any kind,
outweighed the costs. Finally, he was fair enough to believe that
labor was entitled to combine if business could, and wary enough to
understand that if the conspiracy doctrine were not modified, it might
boomerang against combinations of businessmen who competed too
energetically. Thus Shaw drew different conclusions from premises
which he shared with others concerning individualism, freedom, and
competition. The result of his interpretation of the criminal law of
conspiracies was that the newly emerging trade-union movement was
left viable.
But the corporate movement was left viable too, a fact which helps
reconcile the fellow-servant and trade-union decisions. To regard one as
"anti-labor" and the other as "pro-labor" adds nothing to an under-
52. SHAW, op. cit. supra note 47, at 7-8.
53. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 130 (1842).
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standing of two cases governed by different legal considerations; on
the one hand tort and contract, on the other criminal conspiracy. The
fellow-servant case belongs to a line of harsh personal injury decisions
that were unrelated to labor as such. To be sure, labor was saddled
with much of the cost of industrial accidents, but victims of other
accidents hardly fared better. The fellow-servant decision also repre-
sented a departure of the maxim respondeat superior which might im-
pose liability without fault; while the trade-union decision, intended in
part to draw the fangs of labor's support of the codification movement,
represented a departure from Hawkin's conspiracy doctrine which
might impose criminality on business as well as labor.
Despite the conflicting impact of the two decisions on labor's
fortunes and the fact that they are not comparable from a legal stand-
point they harmonize as a part of Shaw's thought. He regarded the
worker as a free agent competing with his employer as to the terms.
of employment, at liberty to refuse work if his demands were not
met. As the best judge of his own welfare, he might assume risks,
combine in a closed shop, or make other choices. For Shaw, workers
possessed the same freedom of action enjoyed by employers against
labor and against business rivals.
Compared to such Whig peers as Webster, Story, and Choate,
Shaw was quite liberal in many respects. Indeed his judicial record
is remarkably like the record one might expect from a jurist of the Jack-
sonian persuasion. Marcus Morton, during ten years of service as
Shaw's associate, found it necessary to dissent only once, in Kneeland's
case. No doubt the inherited legal tradition created an area of agreement
among American jurists that was more influential in the decision-
making process than party differences. Yet it is revealing that many
of Shaw's opinions might conceivably have been written by a Gibson,
but not by a Kent. It was not just the taught tradition of the common
law which Shaw and Gibson shared; they shared also taught traditions
of judicial self-restraint, of the positive state, and the "Commonwealth
idea," a term that is meaningful in Pennsylvania's history as well as in
Massachusetts' .54
But personality makes a difference in law as in politics. It over-
simplifies to say, as Pound has, that the "chiefest factor in determining
the course which legal development will take with respect to any new
situation or new problem is the analogy or analogies that chance to be
at hand... .15"' There are usually conflicting and alternative analogies,
54. See generally HARTZ, EcoNoMIc POlICY AND DZMOCRATIc THOUGHT: PENN-
SYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948).
55. POUND, THs SPIRIT Olt THS COMMON LAW 12 (1921).
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rules, and precedents from among which judges may choose. The
direction of choice is shaped by such personal factors as the judge's
calculation of the community's needs, his theory of the function of
government, his concept of the role of the court, inexpressible intuitions,
unrecognized predilections, and perhaps doting biases. It is difficult to
name a single major case decided by Shaw which might not have
gone the other way had another been sitting in his place.
Shaw interpreted the received law as he understood it, and his
understanding was colored by his own presuppositions, particularly in
respect to those interests and values he thought the legal order should
secure. Few other judges have been so earnestly and consciously con-
cerned with the public policy implicit in the principle of a case.
Much of his greatness lay in this concern for principle and policy.
"It is not enough," he observed, "to say, that the law is so established
. . . The rule may be a good rule . . . But some better reason must
be given for it than that, so it was enacted, or so it was decided." 56 He
thought it necessary to search out the rule which governed a case; to
ask "upon what principle is it founded ?" and to deliver a disquisition on
the subject, with copious illustrations for the guidance of the future.
From the bench he was one of the nation's foremost teachers of law.
His opinions did not overlook the question "cui bono?" which, he
believed, "applies perhaps with still greater force to the laws, than to
any other subject." ' That is why he fixed "enlightened public policy"
at the root of all legal principles, along with "reason" and "natural
justice." '58 He understood that American law was a functioning instru-
ment of a free society, embodying its ideals, serving its interests. It is
not surprising, then, that he tended to minimize precedent and place
his decisions on broad grounds of social advantage. Justice Holmes,
attributing Shaw's greatness to his "accurate appreciation of the re-
quirements of the community," thought that "few have lived who were
his equals in their understanding of the grounds of public policy to
which all laws must be ultimately referred. It was this which made
him . . . the greatest magistrate which this country has produced." '59
To be sure, he made errors of judgment and policy. Yet the wonder
is that his errors were so few, considering the record number of opin-
ions which he delivered, on so many novel questions, in so many fields
of law.
56. Shaw, Profession .of the Lawu in the United States. (Extract from an
address delivered before the Suffolk Bar, May, 1827) AM. Ju. VII, 56-65 (1832).
57. Ibid.
58. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.RL, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267
(1854). -
59. HOLMES, THE CoM oN LAW 106 (1881).
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Perhaps his chief contribution was his day-by-day domestication
of the English common law. He made it plastic and practical, pre-
serving its continuities with what was worthwhile in the past, yet
accommodating it to the ideals and shifting imperatives of American life.
The Massachusetts Bar made a similar evaluation of his work when
honoring the "old Chief" upon his resignation. The Bar, speaking
through a distinguished committee, declared:
It was the task of those who went before you, to show that the
principles of the common and the commercial law were available
to the wants of communities which were far more recent than
the origin of those systems. It was for you to adapt those systems
to still newer and greater exigencies; to extend them to the solution
of questions, which it required a profound sagacity to foresee, and
for which an intimate knowledge of the law often enabled you to
provide, before they had even fully arisen for judgment. Thus it
has been that in your hands the law has met the demands of a
period of unexampled activity and enterprise; while over all its
varied and conflicting interests you have held the strong, con-
servative sway of a judge, who moulds the rule for the present
and the future out of the principles and precedents of the past.
Thus too it has been, that every tribunal in the country has felt
the weight of your judgments, and jurists at home and abroad
look to you as one of the great expositors of the law.6°
Time has not diminished the force of this observation. As Professor
Chafee has noted, "Probably no other state judge has so deeply in-
fluenced the development of commercial and constitutional law through-
out the nation. Almost all the principles laid down by him have proved
sound ... ."'
He was sound in more than his principles. Like John Quincy
Adams, his fellow Bay-Statesman whom he resembled in so many
ways, he made his name a synonym for integrity, impartiality, and inde-
pendence. Towering above class and party, doing everything for
justice and nothing for fear or favor, he was a model for the American
judicial character. And none but an Adams could compare with Shaw
in his overpowering sense of public service and devotion to the good
of the whole community. His achievement as a jurist is to be sought
in his constructive influence upon the law of our country and in the
fact so perfectly summed up in a tribute to him on his death: life,
liberty, and property were safe in his hands.
60. Address on Chief Justice Shaw's resignation, Sept. 10, 1860, Supplement, 81
Mass. 599, 603 (1860).
61. Chafee, Lemuel Shaw, Dictionary of American Biography.
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